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Résumé / Abstract
Nous considérons dans cet article la détermination, en information
incomplète, de normes légales optimales pour à la fois inciter les citoyens à faire
preuve de diligence (prévention) et motiver les agents de la paix à veiller au
respect des lois. Linteraction stratégique entre citoyens et agents de la paix
détermine lefficacité des normes choisies. Notre résultat principal est à leffet
quun écart entre bénéfices marginaux et coûts marginaux de la diligence est
nécessaire afin de réduire les coûts dapplication des lois. De plus, les normes
peuvent être un substitut aux amendes lorsque les pénalités pour infraction sont
fixes. Des amendes maximales peuvent en particulier être contre-indiquées
lorsque les normes sont optimalement déterminées.
This paper examines the setting of optimal legal standards to
simultaneously induce parties to invest in care and to motivate law enforcers
to detect violators of the law. The strategic interaction between care providers
and law enforcers determines the degree of efficiency achieved by the
standards. Our principal finding is that some divergence between the
marginal benefits andmarginal costs of providing care is required to control
enforcement costs. Further, the setting of standards may effectively substitute
for the setting of fines when penalties for violation are fixed. In particular,
maximal fines may be welfare reducing when standards are set optimally.
Mots Clés : Normes légales, amendes, respect des lois, comportement
stratégique
Keywords : Law Enforcement, Legal Standards, Fines, Strategic Behavior
JEL : D82, K42
Most recently displeasure with the performance of the Internal Revenue's Service
1
prompted Congress to cut the agency's compliance budget. Previous to this Congress had similarly
intervened in the affairs of the FTC and the EPA to correct what it perceived as inappropriate
enforcement of government policy.
This approach differs significantly from most of the formal literature on law
2
enforcement and monitoring, as exemplified by Baron and Besanko (1984), Border and Sobel (1987)
and Mookherjee and P'ng (1992, 1994), These analyses assume that law enforcers can commit to a
monitoring strategy independent of whether the strategy uncovers violators in equilibrium. A notable
exception is Graetz et al (1986) who assume that enforcers are motivated by the fines they collect
from prosecuting violators.
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1. Introduction
For most parties the threat of being fined or punished provides incentives
to take care not to harm others. For instance, motorists may obey traffic regulations,
industrial firms may resist fouling the air, and manufacturers may produce safe toys
all to avoid fines for violation of standards.
The chance that a party will be fined not only depends on his action, but
also on the effort that law enforcers exert to insure compliance. Recent experience
reveals that it is difficult for public officials to control the behavior of enforcement
agencies. This suggests that law enforcers need to be motivated to detect violators,1
perhaps by rewarding them according to their success in discovering violations.2
In such a setting the equilibrium interaction between potential offenders
and law enforcers will determine how regulations are observed and enforced. The
amount of effort enforcers exert will depend on the perceived likelihood that parties
have violated standards, and the likelihood of violation will depend on how
vigorously the law is enforced. In turn the behavior of offenders and enforcers will
be shaped by the standards determining if a party has violated the law. Examples of
standards include a maximum number of product failures a manufacturer can
experience before violating a safety code, or a minimum concentration of effluents
found in a water sample that cause a waste discharger to violate emission
regulations.
Beginning with Becker (1968) most analyses of the economics of
enforcement have taken legal standards as given, and focused on the setting of fines
as the primary tool of enforcement. In practice, though, the ability of enforcers to
vary statutory fines is restricted by political, moral and legal constraints. In contrast,
agencies may have some discretion in setting standards for determining when a
party's actions are harmful. The primary goal of this paper is to characterize how
the setting of legal standards affects the behavior of complying parties, law
enforcers, and the net social surplus generated by the regulation. Another goal of
the paper is to examine the extent to which setting standards and fines are substitute
To a first order, a small change in standards has no effect on net benefits since marginal
3
benefits and marginal costs of care are the same.
For instance, it may not be necessary to expend much effort by employing sophisticated
4
measuring devices to detect excessive discharge of effluents when polluters are in obvious violation
of the law.
4
instruments for law enforcement.
Under optimal circumstances, where law enforcers can costlessly detect
violations, offending parties should be induced to select care so that the marginal
cost of care equals the social marginal benefit. However, we find that when
enforcers must be incented to monitor compliance, it is desirable to induce care
levels that either exceed or fall short of the surplus maximizing level.
The intuition for this finding is that some distortions in care are required
to reduce the cost of law enforcement. Suppose standards are initially set so that the
marginal costs and benefits from taking care are equated. Then a slight variation
in standards will not appreciably affect net benefits, but it will cause a nontrivial3
adjustment in the enforcer's costs and effort. In some instances a slight loosening of
standards will decrease enforcement costs. This will arise whenever looser
standards causes enforcers to reduce their effort because the marginal returns from
monitoring decrease as the probability of noncompliance decreases. We refer to this
as the complements case because monitoring effort and standards are
complementary inputs in determining the probability of a violation. In this instance,
it will be desirable to loosen standards and induce less care in order to reduce the
costs of enforcement.
For other applications monitoring effort may fall as the probability of
noncompliance increases. This will arise if the returns from monitoring compliance
in order to prove a violation will diminish as the degree of noncomplying behavior
increases. For this case, referred to as the substitutes case it will be desirable to4
set tighter standards and induce greater care in order to reduce the enforcer's
expenditure on effort.
This is the central result of the paper which is formally derived in Section
3. In Section 4 we consider the possibility that the costs of monitoring effort vary
by the enforcer's ability to observe and process information. These costs are known
privately by the enforcer. We show that the presence of asymmetric information
reinforces our main finding that violation standards are distorted to reduce
enforcement costs.
In section 5 we examine the possibility that parties differ in the costs they
incur in taking care. We show how our main finding generalizes to this case, and
demonstrate the optimality of allowing the highest cost parties to pay a fixed fee
which absolves them from prosecution for a violation. Further, we demonstrate that
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This specification of care benefits is made for simplicity and is not essential for the
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foregoing analysis.
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corrupt enforcers can collude with potential offenders to similarly offer high cost
parties protection from the law in exchange for a bribe.
In section 6 we examine the relationship between fines and standards. We
find that , in contrast to Becker (1968), it is not necessarily desirable to impose the
largest fine. Increases in fines may increase costly enforcement effort.
The paper is concluded in section 7 with a summary of results and
suggestions for further research. The elements of our model are introduced in the
next section and all formal results are derived in the appendix. We relegate the
discussion of related findings in the literature to those sections of the paper where
the results for comparison with the literature are presented.
2. Elements of the Basic Model
There exists a party who can exert some care denoted by q > 0 to avoid
harming other individuals. For instance q, may be the discretion a motorist
exercises to avoid an accident; q may be the control of emissions by a waste
discharger, or q may be product quality a manufacturer supplies to avoid
breakdowns. The party incurs a monetary cost or disutility of supplying q, denoted
by C(q) which is increasing and strictly convex with . Social benefits
from q are given by Bq, where B > 0, is the constant marginal benefit.5
The government sets a standard, denoted by s, as a criterion for
determining if a party has exercised proper care. Depending on the application, s
may be a speed limit which motorists must obey, or a maximum allowable
concentration of pollutants in a discharger's water or air sample. To avoid the
daunting task of explicitly modeling the bureaucratic and legal process by which
violators are prosecuted we adopt a simpler reduced form description of the
enforcement process. We assume that given s and q there is a probability that the
party will be successfully cited for violating the standard denoted
by , where e is the effort the law enforcer supplies to monitor the
party. We assume that this probability is decreasing as the party supplies more
care at an increasing rate with , and whenever e > 0. A tightening
of standards increases the citation probability , for e > 0. Further is
increasing in the enforcer's effort, at a decreasing rate so that .
This implies that the burden of proof falls on the enforcer to demonstrate that a
violation has occurred. Finally, we assume that the sign
which means that an increase in standards or a decrease in care both have the same
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A simple specification that satisfies our assumptions is
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measures the gap between the standard and the care provided,
and . In the context of pollution standards, might measure the difference between
acceptable and actual effluent concentration in a water or air sample for example.
An example of a monitoring technology satisfying all the assumptions we have posited
7
for the substitutes case is
where
In this example, an agent exercises care q to produce a product with quality The enforcer
observes a signal of egality, , given by .
Exerting greater effort allows the enforcer to observe quality with greater percision as reflected in the
specification for One can easily verify that this specification satisfies our assumptions for
the substitutes case.
A slight variation on the first example allows us to produce another monitoring technology which
satisfies all of our assumptions for the complements case. Here we assume that
where
Then for
7
qualitative effect on the enforcer's marginal returns from effort, .6
As mentioned in the introduction, we distinguish between two cases
describing how an increase in standards affects the incentives for enforcers to
monitor. In the complements case and an increase in standards
increases the marginal returns to monitoring. This might arise, for instance, if a
party is cited whenever he is simultaneouly violating the law and he is being
monitored by the enforcer. In that case a tightening of standards will increase the
probability that the party is in fact violating the law, which will therefore increase
the enforcers returns from monitoring. In the substitutes case, and
a tightening of standards reduces the marginal returns to monitoring. This situation
arises, for example, if the enforcer knows whether a party has violated the law, but
he must expend effort to prove the violation has occurred. When standards are
tightened violations of the law are easier to demonstrate. Consequently, the
enforcers expenditure of effort required to prove a violation is reduced. 7
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which satisfies the assumptions required for the complements case.
This treatment of fines differs from the economics of crime literature, as exemplified by
8
Becker (1968), Stigler (1970), Polinski and Shavell (1979), Malik (1990) Andreoni (1991) and
Mookerherjee and P'ng (1992, 1994), which typically treats variations in fines as a primary
enforcement tool. In reality the level of fines is set by the legislative branch, and the ability to adjust
statutory penalties is restricted as noted by Graetz et al (1986) Harrington (1988) points out that
the fines for violation of environmental standards are constrained to be quite small.
We are assuming that economies of scale in collecting and processing information
9
dictate that enforcement be centralized.
This approach is also employed by Graetz et al (1986) in their analysis of tax
10
compliance. Our results do not change significantly if we assume more generally that the agency is
rewarded based on some increasing function of the fines collected. For instance, promotion of agency
personnel may be conditioned on their success at prosecuting violators.
Alternatively, we might imagine that enforcement is undertaken by a private firm
11
selected by the government. The relative advantages of employing private versus public law enfor-
cement are discussed in Becker and Stigler (1974), Landes and Posner (1975) and Polinski (1980).
8
If cited the party pays a fine, F > 0 for his offense. Consequently, the
expected penalty for a violation is given by . Throughout
most of our analysis we assume that F is fixed, thus allowing us to focus on the
setting of standards as the primary tool for shaping compliance and enforcement
behavior. Later in section 6 we examine the implications of varying the level of the8
fines, as well as the extent to which fines and standards are substitute instruments
for law enforcement.
Enforcement of the standard is delegated to a single agency, who supplies
effort to monitor potential offenders. There is a cost borne by the agency personnel9
of supplying effort given by the function, D(e), which is strictly increasing and
convex in effort with . We make the realistic assumption that it is not
possible for public officials to commit the agency to an enforcement policy or to
know how diligently the agency enforces standards. Any agency model is likely
to be deficient in describing some aspects of bureaucratic behavior, nonetheless we
require some paradigm to proceed. We therefore assume that the agency selects an
enforcement strategy to maximize the expected sum of fines collected net of the
costs of enforcement effort.10 11,
The interaction between the party and the enforcer is modeled as a game.
The party chooses care q(e;s), given the enforcer's effort and the standard where
. The enforcer chooses effort e(q;s)
A ' 0
e(q;s) ' argmax
,
{A(q,e,s)'P(q,e,s)&D(e)%T}
V ' (Bq&T)%U%8A
8 < 1
Alternatively, T is a tax which allows the government to collect excess revenues when
12
the agency generates positive profits.
In the symmetric information case of section 3 the government sets T = P-D, so that
13
, and the government's objective function simplifies to become Bq-C -D.
9
given the party's care decision and the standard, where
. T is a government transfer paid
to the agency to insure it breaks even. A Nash equilibrium to this game consists12
of a decision pair {q(s), e(s)} such that q(s) = q(e(s);s) and e(s) = e(q(s);s). Below
we demonstrate that such an equilibrium exists and that it is unique given s.
We assume that the government's objective function,
, is the societal benefit of care net of government subsidies
to the enforcer (Bq-T), plus the utility of the party, U, plus the enforcer's profit,
discounted by . The discounting of enforcer profits derives from the fact that
the government's primary constituency is the public at large, including the care
providing parties. In this case the government limits the agencys profit to zero.13
Rewriting V, the governments problem [G-P] becomes
max V(s) = max B(q(s)) - C(q(s)) - D(e(s)) [G-P]
The government selects a standard s to maximize the net benefit of inducing a given
level of care, including the costs of enforcement given the Nash equilibrium
behavior of the party and the enforcer.
&P
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This result arises because the marginal reduction in expected fines from increasing care
14
is decreased when enforcement effort is increased in the substitutes case.
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3. Analysis of the Simple Case
For a given standard, s, the corresponding Nash equilibrium care level and
enforcement effort are characterized by
(3.1)
(3.2)
Given e, and s, the party selects care to equate the marginal reduction in expected
fines to the marginal cost of care. The enforcer optimally responds to q and s by
selecting effort to equate the increase in expected fines to the marginal cost of
effort. Given our assumptions we have:
Proposition 1: A unique Nash equilibrium exists satisfying (3.1),(3.2)
The reaction functions for the party and the enforcer and the resulting Nash
equilibrium for the case of complements and substitutes are displayed respectively
in Figures 1a and 1b. When the standard and enforcement effort are complements,
an increase in care decreases the probability of noncompliance which causes the
enforcer to allocate less effort as indicated by the negatively sloped reaction func-
tion e(q:s) in Figure 1a. A decrease in enforcement effort induces less care as
reflected by the positive slope of the q(e:s) reaction function. By contrast in the
substitutes case, Figure 1b reveals that an increase in care induces greater effort
from the enforcer, whereas greater enforcement effort causes the party to be less
careful.14
The Nash equilibrium characterized by (3.1) and (3.2) corresponds to a
given standard, s. To investigate how the equilibrium behavior of the party and
enforcer vary with different standard levels we introduce the following assumption
Assumption 1:
Assumption 1 provides sufficient conditions for determining how enforcement effort
varies with the tightness of the standards. To interpret this condition, note that
P(q,e,s)'P(s&q,e)'P(*,e),
(dq/ds)*
de'0
' 1 > P
**
/(P
**
% C ))) ' (dq(e(s), s)/ds)*
de(s)'0
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*
de'0
P (q,e,s) ' p (s&q ,e)
When then
15
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measures the response of care to an increase in standards required for the enforcer
to maintain a constant level of effort. The expression
reflects the actual change in care for an increase in standards undertaken by the
party assuming enforcement effort in unchanged. Assumption 1 requires that the
actual change in care undertaken by the party is insufficient to maintain the
enforcement effort at a constant level. This simply implies that a change in
standards will induce a nonzero response from the enforcement agency. Assumption
1 is satisfied for the example where .15
The effect of tightening the standard on equilibrium care and enforcement
is characterized by:
Proposition 2: A tightening of standards always leads to greater care.
Given Assumption 1, tighter standards lead to more enforcement effort in the
complements case, and it leads to less effort in the substitutes case.
According to Proposition 2, the party always increases care as standards tighten to
partially reduce the probability of being cited. Despite this increase in care, the
opportunity for the enforcer to find a violation increases with a tightening of
standards. This leads to an increase in effort when standards and effort are
complements as the enforcer's marginal return from effort increases. In contrast,
when effort and standards are substitutes the enforcer reduces effort since there is
less need for monitoring to convict the party.
The government sets a standard to maximize the net benefits from care,
including enforcement costs. If enforcement were costless, it would be optimal to
set standards to induce care levels which equate the marginal benefit and marginal
cost of care. This prescription for setting standards will not be optimal, however,
when enforcement is costly. For suppose we begin with such a standard and assume
that effort and standards are complements. A small reduction in standards will
decrease care, but there will be virtually no effect on net benefits since the marginal
benefits and marginal costs of care are approximately equal. However, a small
reduction in standards will cause enforcement effort costs to decrease by a non
neglible amount. Consequently a small reduction in standards below the level which
s
s < s(q() B & C )(q ( s)) > 0
s > s (q() B & C )(q ( s)) < 0
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would cause the marginal benefits and costs of care to be equated, will result in an
increase in net surplus inclusive of compliance costs. A similar argument
establishes that when standards and enforcement effort are substitutes, it is optimal
to increase standards above the level which would induce the net benefit
maximizing level of care. This is the intuition underlying the following proposition.
In that proposition we refer to q* as the care level which maximizes the net benefits
from care (excluding enforcement costs) and s(q*) as the standard which induces
q* in equilibrium.
Proposition 3: Let be the solution to [GP]. In the complements case,
and as the optimal standard induces less
than the net surplus maximizing level of care. In the substitutes case,
and as the optimal standard induces
more than the net surplus maximizing level of care.
Proposition 3 shows how the enforcement monitoring technology influences the
standards for due care, as well as the care level provided in equilibrium. When
standards and effort are complements, then standards must be relaxed to prevent
enforcers from being overzealous in ensuring compliance. This could possibly
explain why some safety and environmental standards appear to be too lax from the
view point of the general public. Landes and Posner (1975) have similarly noted
that it may be necessary to reduce violation fines to prevent over investment by
private enforcers.
The results for the substitutes case are perhaps more surprising. One's
intuition might suggest that when enforcement is costly this would add to the costs
of inducing parties to take care thus making it optimal to induce lower care.
However in the substitutes case, compliance costs are reduced by making it easier
for enforcers to convict parties by tightening the standards,but tighter standards
induce the parties to supply greater care.
4. Privately Informed Enforcer
In this section we extend our basic model to consider instances in which
the enforcer's cost of effort is private knowledge. Such cases may arise when the
cost of monitoring varies by the diligence required to apprehend offenders, by the
nature of the offense, or by the characteristics of the parties. All of these attributes
may be privately known by the enforcement agency. Hidden information may
present difficulties for the government, if it operates under a fixed budget, and the
agency claims its costs of enforcement are high. The government must insure the
agency staff are adequately compensated to insure their participation, but it also
must minimize the expenditures required to run the agency. We focus here on how
D
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To our knowledge the impact of privately informed enforcers on the design of optimal
16
fines and standards has not been analyzed in the literature.
We continue to assume that D is increasing and strictly convex in e, and
17
that
That is, the menu is designed so that type will choose
18
13
care standards are optimally set under these circumstances.16
Suppose that the cost of effort is given by D(e,2) where 2 is a cost
parameter known privately by the enforcer, with the properties that (e,2), De2
(e,2) > 0 so that total cost and marginal cost of enforcement are increasing in2.17
The government is unaware of the realization of 2, but it knows that 2 is distributed
according to the density
We assume that the timing of the interaction between the government , the
agency and the party is: first, the agency observes 2. Second, the government offers
the agency a menu of contracts {T(2),s(2)}, where the dependence of the pair on
2, denotes that it is intended for the agency of type 2. T is a reimbursement paid18
by the government to the agency to help cover its enforcement expenses. Third, the
agency selects a preferred contract. The contract choice is public knowledge and
the parties update their beliefs about the type of the enforcer based on the agency's
contract choice. Fourth, simultaneously the parties choose their level of care, and
the agency selects enforcement effort. Finally the agency collects fines from those
parties found to be in violation of the standard.
Let denote the agency's expected profit who selects the contract
when their type is 2, where
,
is the equilibrium care level for the standard given that the
enforcer has chosen the contract intended for type . The enforcer's contract
choice affects the parties' beliefs about the enforcer which influences their choice
of care. The equilibrium enforcement effort depends on the standard, as
well as on 2 which is the enforcer's type.
The government's problem [GP-A] for this case is to choose
to
     [GP-A]
where is the expectation taken with respect to , and such that for all :
(i) the agency breaks even , , (ii) the party picks the contract
A(2*2) $ A(2
)
*2)
2
2 s ( (2)
s (2) 2
s (2) s (2) # s (2) # s ((2)
s(2) $ s (2) $ s ( (2)
2 > 2
s ((2)
q( s (2)) < q( s (2)) < q (
q( s (2)) > q( s (2)) > q (
Another possible policy for the government is to offer pooling or semi-pooling
19
contracts in which several different types of enforcers are induced to accept the same contract. In this
case, the enforcer's choice of a contract would not necessarily reveal his type. Such a policy might be
beneficial if it were less costly to enforce standards when the enforcer's type was not known by the
care providers. Deriving conditions under which pooling or separating contracts are preferred seems
quite difficult, and therefore determining the optimal form of contract remains an open question.
Although we focus on separating contracts in our discussion, we demonstrate in the appendix that
Proposition 4 also holds for the case of pooling contracts.
14
which is intended for it, .
In what follows, we focus on the separating equilibria solution to [GP-A]
in which each type is induced to select a separate contract. As a convenient19
benchmark for this solution to [GP-A] consider the complete information case,
analyzed in section 3 , where the government and the party know the agency's cost
parameter, , at the time of contracting. Let be the standard which induces
the party to choose the net benefit maximizing care, q*, in equilibrium. Refer
to as the optimal standard given the agency is known to be of type . We
then have:
Proposition 4: In the separating solution to [GP-A] the optimal
standard, satisfies (i) for the complements
case, and (ii) for the substitutes case (with strict
inequality for in both cases) .
The presence of a privately informed agency causes a greater distortion in standards
away from ,the level which induces the net benefit maximizing care. This
arises because the agency will try to overstate its costs to obtain a more favorable
contract from the government. In the case of complements the government reacts
by reducing compliance standards which decreases the enforcer's effort. This
renders it less attractive for a low cost enforcer to claim to be high cost, by reducing
the number of effort units over which he can exercise his cost advantage. As a result
of the reduction in standards the party provides less care as
When effort and care are substitutes the government increases the
standards, thus reducing the incentives for the enforcer to monitor. Again this
makes it less attractive for a low cost enforcer to pretend to be high cost, because
it reduces the number of effort units over which he may exercise his cost advantage.
This tightening of standards induces the party to increase its care as
.
5. Heterogenous Parties
In this section we examine desired alterations in optimal standards when
C(q ,F) F
F, with,C
F
,C
Fq
> 0, for q > 0 F
g(F) > 0 for Fg[F ,F].
q (s,F) ' argmax(&P(e(s),q (s),s) & C(q,F))
(&P(q (s,F)e(s),s) & C(q (s,F),F)) # &A
q(s,F)
Fg ( F,F] for F < F F
max E
F < F
{Bq (s,F) & C(q(F,s),F)} & D (F( F)e(s))
For instance, firms may differ according to the costs they incur to reduce pollution.
20
Alternatively, parties may self report their violations to the agency, where upon they
21
are assessed a fixed fee. as in Kaplow and Shavell (1994).
In theory if the set of potential offenders was known by the government, a menu of
22
different standards and fines could be offered to separate out offenders by their cost of taking care.
This approach is employed by Mookherjee and P'ng(1994) in their analysis of marginal deterrence of
crime. Such fine tuning of standards is impractical however when the identity of the offenders is
unknown at the time standards are determined.
We continue to assume that C is increasing and strictly convex in q with C (0,F) = 0.23
q
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there is a heterogenous population of parties varying according to their cost of
taking care. Variations in cost arise because the parties have access to different
methods to reduce the harmful effects of their behavior. Further we assume that20
the parties are privately informed about their cost of taking care. As in the previous
cases we've studied, the government sets a uniform standard which parties must
adhere to. However, with a heterogenous population, the government may grant
higher cost parties immunity from the standard, if they pay a fix fee. This21
arrangement saves high cost parties the expense of meeting standards, while
reducing the enforcers monitoring costs.22
We model the heterogenous party population by assuming that an
individual's cost of care is given by , where is a privately observed cost
parameter. Total and marginal costs are increasing in
. The density of parties of type in the23
population, which is normalized to one is given by
We assume the government offers parties the choice of either paying a
fixed assessment, A to the enforcer, which exempts them from being cited, or the
choice of trying to meet the standard, s. Let
, be party type F's optimal care to
avoid being fined. Given A, and q, type F's response is to pay A and avoid
providing care if , otherwise the party
provides care . For a given A, some subset of the highest cost individuals
will elect to pay the assessment, A. The cutoff type, will
just be indifferent between investing in care and paying the assessment to avoid
being cited.
The government's problem, for the case of heterogenous parties, [GP-P]
is to choose the assessment A to
[GP-P]
F > F
s
s (
E
F < F
{Bq(s,F) & C(q(s,F),F)}
F
v ( F) ' Bq ( s, F) & C (q( s, F), F) & D ) (F( F)e( s))e( s) ' 0
s < s ( s > s (
v(F)
max E
F < F
){P(q (s,F),e,s)} & D(F(F
)
)e) % (1&F(F) )) Y % T
Fg (F
)
, F ] F
)
One rationale for why corrupt agents may trust one another to honor agreements is that
24
they may want to maintain a reputation for being reliable. See Tirole (1992) for one approach to
modeling collusion between corrupt individuals.
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The maximand in [GP-P] represents the expected net benefit of care minus the
enforcement costs taken over the population of parties investing in positive care
levels. Those parties who exempt themselves, contribute zero net benefits
and impose zero enforcement costs on society. The solution to [GP-P] is
characterized in the following proposition. In that proposition we refer to as the
optimal standard, and as the standard that maximizes
Proposition 5: In the solution to [GP-P] (i) no parties are exempted
from standards when B is sufficiently large, (ii) when exemption occurs
A < F , a n d s a t i s f i e s
(iii)
for the case of complements, and (iv) for the case of
substitutes.
Part (i) of Proposition 5 indicates that parties are exempted only if the benefits from
taking care are sufficiently small, otherwise even high cost care providers are
induced to provide care. Part (ii ) indicates when exemption arises that higher cost
parties opt to pay the assessment rather than risk paying a higher fine if they are
cited. The assessment is set at a level so that only those parties with a negative care
contribution to social welfare , net of marginal enforcement costs, , seek
exemption. Parts (iii) and (iv) verify that the same distortion in standards arises
when parties are heterogenous as when they are homogenous.
When exemptions are possible, dishonest enforcers may also take bribes
from parties not wanting to provide care. To analyze this possibility, suppose for
now that government sanctioned exemptions are not offered, perhaps because the
benefits from care are too large. Imagine that the enforcer offers any party an
exemption from being monitored if the party pays the enforcer a bribe equal to Y.
Assume also that such illegal activity goes unnoticed by the government, and that
agreements between parties and the enforcer are kept. Given the standard, s, the24
enforcer's problem , [EP] is to set the level of the bribe, Y and enforcement effort
e(s) to
[EU]
where all parties pay the bribe and type is indifferent to paying the
(1 & F(F) ) & Y(dF)/dY )f(F) )) ' &{P(q(s,F) ),e (s),s) & D )(F(F) )e (s))e (s)}(dF)/dY)f(F))
Fg (F
)
, F ]
We conjecture that A will be less than Y for B sufficiently small, although we have so
25
far been unable to verify this.
Several analyses have discovered reasons why maximal fines may be not be desired.
26
Malik (1990) demonstrates that increasing fines may increase agent's avoidance behavior, thus
leading to higher enforcement costs. Andreoni (1992) argues that juries are less apt to convict
offenders when fines are more severe. thus reducing the deterrence power of maximal fines. Polinski
and Shavell (1979) argue that maximal fines are welfare decreasing in that some offenses should not
be deterred if marginal benefits of the crime exceed the marginal costs. Stigler (1970) and
Mookherjee and P'ng (1994) show that fines should be varied continuously in order to maintain
marginal deterrence in enforcement.
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bribe and investing in care. The solution to the enforcer's problem is characterized
in
Proposition 6: In the solution to [EP], (i) the enforcer always offers a
bribe Y < F which the higher cost parties pay. (ii) Y
satisfies
According to Proposition 6 the enforcer always offers a bribe which some non
negligible subset of the higher cost parties agree to pay for exempting themselves
from being cited. The optimal bribe, characterized by the equality in (ii) sets the
enforcer's marginal revenue from an increase in the bribe to the marginal increase
in the collection of fines as more types invest in care in response to an increase in
the bribe.
Propositions 5 and 6 suggest that if illegal bribes cannot be detected, high
cost parties will always exempt themselves from fines by paying the enforcer a fee.
In cases where the benefits from care are large, the fee will be a bribe paid to the
enforcer, as assessments for exemptions will not be sanctioned by the government.
In cases where the benefits from care are small, the fee may be a government
sanctioned assessment, if A is less than Y.25
6. Setting Optimal Fines
To this point in our analysis we have assumed the level of fine for a
violation, F, is fixed exogenously. Here we investigate whether increases in F are
welfare improving. Becker (1968) first observed that larger fines deter parties from
breaking the law and thus reduce enforcement effort required to insure compliance.
As we demonstrate, this argument may fail to apply when the enforcer's effort
supply depends on the probability that the party is in compliance.26
Suppose the fine, F, is increased. This will cause the government to adjust
s
de/dF dq/dF
>
'
<
0 as(de/ds)/(dq/ds)
>
'
<
(de/dF) /dq/dF)
(de/ds)/(dq/ds) >
'
<
(de/dF)/(dq/dF) as d/ds {&P
e
/P
q
}
>
'
<
0.
P
es
< 0 d/ds{&P
e
/P
q
} < 0
The optimal standard satisfies dV/ds = 0 or B-C )/D = (de/ds)/(dq/ds).
27
q e
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its optimal standard, , and it will induce both the party and the enforcer to adjust
their behavior. Let and represent respectively the rate of change in
equilibrium enforcement effort and care as F is increased. Then the increase in
welfare from a change in F can be written as
dV/dF = (B-C )(dq/dF) -D (de/dF)q e
= {(B-C )/D - (de/dF)/(dq/dF)}D (dq/dF)q e e
(6.1)
where the first line of (6.1) follows from the Envelope Theorem, the second line
follows from the first by rearranging terms and the last line follows from the
condition for setting optimal standards, (dV/ds = 0).27
A necessary and sufficient condition for ordering (de/ds)/(dq/ds) and
(de/dF)/(dq/dF) and thus determining whether increasing fines is welfare enhancing
is given in
Proposition 7:
To interpret (6.1) note that under the optimal standard (de/ds)/(dq/ds) represents
the rate at which enforcement effort and care may vary while keeping total surplus
constant. In the complements case, too little care is allocated. An increase in F will
induce the party to provide more care, but it will also cause the enforcer to expend
more effort. If the rate at which extra effort expended for an increase in care is
sufficiently small ( less than (de/ds)/(dq/ds)) then increasing the fine will increase
welfare. Otherwise increasing the fine will reduce welfare, if it will induce too much
enforcement effort to be expended. A similar argument serves to confirm this
intuition for the case of substitutes.
Proposition 7 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for an increase
in the fine to be welfare decreasing. It's easy to verify that in the substitutes case
where , that . This implies that a small increase in the
violation fine is welfare decreasing and it provides an interesting exception to
Becker's argument for maximal fines. The intuition supporting this finding is that
in the substitutes case, the level of care induced is excessive in order to limit
19
enforcement effort. (see Proposition 3) An increase in the fine reduces welfare, by
causing parties to further increase care which also induces enforcers to expend more
effort.
7. Conclusion
Our analysis offers one rationale for the divergence between the marginal
benefits and the marginal costs from taking care which often arise in practice.
Pollution and safety standards may either be set too loose or too stringent to
discourage enforcers from exerting excess effort. Whether standards are set too low
or too high depends on the available technology for identifying violators.
Our analysis also reveals the importance of setting standards, not only to
influence compliance, but also to shape the behavior of enforcers. In circumstances
where penalties are fixed, varying standards may be one of the few tools policy
makers have to affect compliance and reduce enforcement expenses. In instances
where fines can be varied as well, it may be counterproductive to set maximal fines
which encourage overzealous law enforcement.
P (q,e,s) C (q) D (e) (q,e,s)
A (q,e,s)
q,e# µ < 4

&P
qq
&C
qq
&P
qe
P
qe
P
ee
&D
ee
dq/ds
de/ds
'
P
qs
&P
es
dq
ds
'
P
qs
(P
ee
&D
ee
) & P
qe
P
es
)
> 0
de
ds
'
(P
qq
% C
qq
) P
es
& P
eq
P
qs
) <
>
0 as P
qe
<
>
0
) ' (P
qq
& C
qq
) (P
ee
& D
ee
) % P
2
qe
> 0.
de
ds
'
P
se
P
qe
&
P
qs
(P
qq
% C
qq
)
(P
qq
% C
qq
) P
qe
)
'
dq
ds *
de'0
&
dq(e(s),s)
ds *
de(s)'0
(P
qq
% C
qq
) P
qe
)
20
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The assumptions on and on and suffice to insure U is
strictly concave in q and is strictly concave in e. If we further require that
then by Theorem 3.1 of Friedman (1990), a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists. The conditions on P(q,e,s), C(q) and D(e) further insure that the
Nash equilibium is interior (with e,q > 0) and that it is characterized by the first
order conditions (3.1) and (3.2) in the text. Finally, uniqueness of equilibrium
follows by verifying that the reaction function of the party and of the enforcer are
continuous and have slopes of opposite signs indicating a unique equilibrium at the
single point of intersection.
Proof of Proposition 2
Totally differentiating eqs. (3.1) and (3.2) in the text with respect to s yields the
following:
(A2.1)
Cramers rule applied to (A2.1) implies:
(A2.2)
(A2.3)
where The sign of dq/ds follows
immediately from our assumptions about P and D. To verify the sign of de/ds,
rewrite (A2.3) so that
(A2.4)
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by Assumption 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
The optimal standard satisfies
(A3.1)
Solving for from (A3.1) yields
(A3.2)
It follows from (A3.2) and Proposition 2 that
(A3.3)
Finally, since and q is increasing in s, it follows from (A3.3) that
(A3.4)
Proof of Proposition 4
First we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for satisfying the conditions (i)
and (ii) of [GP-A] in the text. Applying routine arguments (see Guesnerie and
Laffont (1984)) one can readily show that the schedules { } are
differentiable almost everywhere, and that the effort level induced, must
be non-increasing in where . Further,
(A4.1)
where the second line of (A4.1) follows from the Envelope Theorem. Since
is decreasing, part (i) is insured provided
(A4.2)
Combining (A4.1) - (A4.2) parts (i) and (ii) of [GP-A] are satisfied provided,
(A4.3)
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Substituting for from (A4.3) into [GP-A], integrating by parts and rearranging
terms yields
(A4.4)
where we have deleted the arguments of for notational convenience.
Rewriting in terms of and
recognizing that is implicitly a function of we have
(A4.5)
Assuming a separating solution to [GP-A], Let
Then, employing standard revealed preference arguments for all
(A4.6)
(A4.7)
with strict inequality for . Adding (A4.6 ) and (A4.7) and simplifying yields
(A4.8)
This implies, since that
(A4.9)
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(A4.10) we have
(A4.11)
(A4.12)
with strict inequality for , thus proving Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5
The solution to [GP-P] as posed in the text is characterized by the first order
conditions
(A5.1)
(A5.2)
where (A5.1) and (A5.2) correspond respectively to the maximization of [GP-P]
with respect to s and . The Nash equilibrium care and enforcement levels,
are characterized by
(A5.3)
(A5.4)
First we prove parts (iii) and (iv) of the Proposition. Differentiating (A5.3) and
(A5.4) totally w.r.t. s yields:
(A5.5)
(A5.6)
Combining (A5.5) and (A5.6) one obtains
(A5.7)
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(A5.8)
(A5.9)
It follows from Assumption 1 and (A5.7) - (A5.9) that
(A5.10)
In addition (A5.5) and (A5.6) also imply that
(A.5.11)
where the inequality follows from (A5.10). Substituting (A5.10) and (A5.11) into
the first order condition for s, (A5.4) allows one to verify parts (iii) and (iv) of
Proposition 5.
To verify part (i), notice that for B sufficiently large is strictly
positive for all , as both terms and in (A5.2) are bounded
above since and e (s) are bounded, while the term is arbitrarily
large. Hence, and no party types are exempted when the marginal benefits
of care are sufficiently large.
To verify part (ii), notice that for a type which decides to exempt himself
(A5.12)
or A < F. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6
Given s, the first order condition for Y in the solution to the enforcers problem,
[EP] stated in the text is
(A6.1)
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Notice that when
(A6.2)
Substituting for this value of Y in (A6.1) reveals that can not be a solution
to [EP]. Therefore, .
Rearranging (A6.1) and noting that it holds with equality yields the
expression appearing in Proposition 6. Finally, the result that Y < F follows from
noting that
(A6.3)
for all .
Proof of Proposition 7
According to eq (6.1) in the text
The expressions for are given by
(A7.1)
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(A7.5)
where one can easily verify the last equivalence in (A7.5).
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